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    内容提示: Anti-Islamic Protest in the UKDemonstrations by far-right groups, such as the English Defence League, Britain First and PEGIDA, have caused considerable social and civic unrest in UK cities for nearly a decade. But how should policymakers respond to far-right and anti-Muslim activism? Drawing on extensive primary research with stakeholders, local authorities and policymakers, this book investigates the political, socio-economic and historic trends that fuel this form of political extremism across th...

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    Anti-Islamic Protest in the UKDemonstrations by far-right groups, such as the English Defence League, Britain First and PEGIDA, have caused considerable social and civic unrest in UK cities for nearly a decade. But how should policymakers respond to far-right and anti-Muslim activism? Drawing on extensive primary research with stakeholders, local authorities and policymakers, this book investigates the political, socio-economic and historic trends that fuel this form of political extremism across the UK. It also maps the different types of policy responses available to local politicians, police forces and behind-the-scenes policy off i cials involved in the day-to-day management of anti-Islamic street protest. The author demonstrates that it is only through developing successful countermeasures in the realm of politics, security and community-based politics that politicians, police and state actors will truly get to grips with this new far-right activism.Dr William Allchorn is a Post-Doctoral Researcher at the School of Politics and International Studies, University of Leeds, UK. This new series encompasses academic studies within the broad fi elds of ‘extrem-ism’ and ‘democracy.’ These topics have traditionally been considered largely in isola-tion by academics. A key focus of the series, therefore, is the (inter-)relation between extremism and democracy. Works will seek to answer questions such as to what extent ‘extremist’ groups pose a major threat to democratic parties, or how democracy can respond to extremism without undermining its own democratic credentials.The books encompass two strands:Routledge Studies in Extremism and Democracy includes books with an intro-ductory and broad focus which are aimed at students and teachers. These books will be available in hardback and paperback.Fascism, Populism and American DemocracyLeonard WeinbergRadical Right ‘Movement Parties’ in EuropeEdited by Manuela Caiani and Ondřej CísařRoutledge Research in Extremism and Democracy offers a forum for innovative new research intended for a more specialist readership. These books will be in hardback only.Anti-Islamic Protest in the UKPolicy Responses to the Far RightWilliam AllchornAnti-System PartiesFrom Parliamentary Breakthrough to GovernmentMattia ZulianelloFor more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/politics/series/EDRoutledge Studies in Extremism and DemocracySeries Editors: Roger Eatwell, University of Bath, and Matthew Goodwin, University of Kent.Founding Series Editors: Roger Eatwell, University of Bath, and Cas Mudde, University of Antwerp-UFSIA. Anti-Islamic Protest in the UKPolicy Responses to the Far RightWilliam Allchorn First published 2019by Routledge2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RNand by Routledge52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business© William AllchornThe right of William Allchorn to be identif i ed as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identif i cation and explanation without intent to infringe.British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication DataA catalogue record for this book is available from the British LibraryLibrary of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication DataA catalog record for this book has been requestedISBN: 978-1-138-29963-4 (hbk)ISBN: 978-1-315-14377-4 (ebk)Typeset in Times New Romanby Apex CoVantage, LLC To my wife, Lydia, and my family for their support along the way. List of fi gures viiiAcknowledgements ixList of abbreviations and acronyms x Introduction: why policy responses to the EDL and Britain First? 11 Context: the rise of anti-Islamic protest and the evolution of the UK Far Right 102 What policy responses?: UK national policy responses and localised countermeasures to Anti-Islamic protest 223 ‘Where it all began’: policy responses to the EDL and Britain First in Luton 404 Early responses to anti-Islamic protest: policy responses to the EDL and Britain First in Birmingham 685 West Yorkshire’s response to anti-Islamic protest: policy responses to the EDL and Britain First in Bradford 976 ‘Somewhere near the clock tower’: policy responses to the EDL and Britain First in Leicester 1227 Anti-Islamic protest in London’s East End: policy responses to the EDL and Britain First in Tower Hamlets 145 Conclusion: key fi ndings, recommendations and future responses 175Index 184Contents Figures 1.1 Causal model of politicians’ responses 6 2.1 Typology of policy responses 29 2.2 Typology of system-level responses 34 3.1 Luton’s total anti-Islamic demonstrator turnout and arrest count, April 2009–June 2015 42 3.2 ‘Geographies of hate’: mobilisations by Britain First in Luton 43 4.1 ‘Geographies of hate’: mobilisations by Britain First in Birmingham 86 4.2 Birmingham’s total EDL demonstrator turnout and arrest count, July 2009–April 2017 89 5.1 ‘Mapping hate’: mobilisations by Britain First in Bradford 98 AcknowledgementsI would like to thank here a number of people who have helped and supported me throughout the production of this book. First, I would like to thank my friends and family who have offered me a great deal of support over the past few years. In particular, I would like to thank my parents, sister and wife, who have supported me along my academic journey so far.I would also like to thank the School of Politics and International Studies at the University of Leeds. I was enormously grateful to receive the POLIS Research Scholarship that helped fund the PhD phase of this research. I would also like to thank colleagues and members of staff who have provided new angles and per-spectives on the topic of policy responses. In addition, I would also like to thank Dr Gordon Clubb, Professor Matthew Feldman, and Dr Mette Wiggen for offering the crucial feedback and advice on earlier versions of this book manuscript.Third, I would like to thank all forty-eight local politicians and eleven behind-the-scenes policymakers who agreed to participate in the project. Their insights and accounts have helped deepen and expand the horizons of this book far beyond what I had originally imagined. I express the greatest of gratitude for their willingness to take time out of their busy schedules and for sharing with me their experiences of responding to anti-Islamic protest in the UK.Finally, and by no means least, I would like to specif i cally thank my PhD super-visors, Dr Stuart McAnulla and Dr Richard Hayton, for their expert guidance, support and mentoring throughout a large chunk of research that came to form this book. Their comments, insights and willingness to look over earlier iterations of this book have played no small role in making it the sharp and coherent document you see before you. In addition, I would also like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their feedback and suggestions that have greatly enhanced the scope and depth of this study, as well as Craig Fowlie and Rebecca McPhee for their expert editorial advice and direction. Abbreviations and acronymsBNP British National PartyBUF British Union of FascistsCCCPG Community Cohesion Contingency Planning GroupCONTEST UK Government’s Counter-Terrorism StrategyCSE Child Sexual ExploitationDCLG Department of Communities and Local GovernmentEDL English Defence LeagueELM East London MosqueHMIC Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of ConstabulariesLDDC London Docklands Development CooperationMP Member of ParliamentMEP Member of European ParliamentNF National FrontREP Republikaner PartySFC Structured Focused ComparisonTell MAMA Tell Measuring Anti-Muslim AttacksUAF Unite Against FascismUPL United People of Luton IntroductionWhy policy responses to the EDL and Britain First?The role of Islam in the United Kingdom, and Western societies more generally, has become a hot topic over recent decades. Starting with the Salman Rushdie affair in the late 1980s through various measures imposed against jihadi terrorism and culminating in debates on its public expression, Islam and its adherents have been subject to signif i cant antagonism in Western Europe and the United States (Saggar 2008). This antagonism is not at the margins of UK and European poli-tics. One has only to look at the salience of Islam in the 2012 French presidential elections (Alexander 8th April 2012), recent debates about alleged introduction of so-called Islamism in UK schools (Wintour 18th July 2014) and the spectre of ISIS-inspired terror attacks across Europe in 2015, 2016 and 2017 in order to ascertain its mainstream importance.The perceived ‘risky’ status of Islam and Muslim communities has been shown most actively amongst anti-Islamic 1 campaigners. Keen to shrug off reputations of anti-Semitism and classical forms of biological racism, one of the most prominent satellite issues that has come to form the focus of radical right-wing populist cam-paigns since the mid-2000s has been public expressions of Islam. As one key author on the European radical-right suggests, though ‘Islamophobia is certainly not an exclusive feature of the populist radical-right,’ such movements ‘tend to stand out in both the “quality” and quantity’ of their vehemence towards Islam, ‘which they describe as an inherently fundamentalist and imperialist religion-cum-ideology’ (Mudde 2007: 84).In the UK context, the main harbinger of this more anti-Islamic form of politics has been the neo-fascist British National Party (BNP). Keen to modernise its ide-ology away from ethno-nationalism and towards a more populist (and therefore moderate) form of nationalism (Copsey 2007), it successfully fought local and European elections on a ticket of voluntary repatriation of ‘non-indigenous’ citi-zens (BNP 2005: 14) – winning over fi fty Council seats, two places in the Euro-pean Parliament and one Greater London Assembly seat in the process. Since the BNP’s implosion in 2010, however, the organised UK far right has experienced a process of fragmentation and re-orientation back towards a more direct action form of politics. As one recent report has noted, Britain’s far right is now more ‘isolated and in retreat’ than at any point over the past twenty years – ‘becoming more extreme and violent’ in the process (Hope not Hate 7th February 2016). This 2 Introductionhas had the effect, not just of moving the far right onto the UK’s streets, but also transitioning the UK far right into the more pernicious (and criminal space) of online and off l ine anti-Muslim protests and attacks – accounting for two-f i fths of all incidents from 2013 to 2014 (Feldman and Littler July 2014: 3).This book examines responses to two of the most signif i cant anti-Islam move-ments in Europe at the time of this transition, the English Defence League (EDL) and Britain First. Starting with the former, the EDL’s emergence came in response to the picketing of a UK army regiment’s homecoming parade in the South Bed-fordshire town of Luton by the Islamist extremist organisation Al-Muhajiroun (Harrison 14th March 2009). Calling itself a ‘human rights organisation,’ the EDL aims to ‘protect the inalienable rights of all people to protest against radical Islam’s encroachment into the lives of non-Muslims’ (EDL Website 2013). At its emergence in June 2009, the group mixed a unique blend of ultra-patriotism and anti-Muslim populist politics, with a potent harnessing of social media to recruit supporters and publicise its activities. Its modus operandi – and the focus of this book – has, however, been its off l ine activities: organising over fi fty sizeable and disruptive protests in towns and cities across the UK in order to demonstrate against what it sees as the ‘creeping’ effects of ‘Islamisation’ within UK public life (Goodwin et al. 2016: 5).Turning the latter, and drawing its lineage more directly from the BNP, Brit-ain First is a slightly different ‘beast’ when compared with the EDL. Initially launched in May 2011 via the website, ‘British Resistance’ (The British Resist-ance 13th November 2011), Britain First started as a formally constituted far-right political party that combined the expertise of former BNP fundraiser Jim Dowson and former BNP Councillor Paul Golding. As one report by anti-fascist collective, Hope not Hate, suggests: ‘Britain First . . . managed to escape the ghetto of race hate pages on social media by pressing and heavily pushing a message of moral outrage and panic into mainstream issues’ (Hope not Hate June 2014: 16). Indeed, by June 2014, it was estimated that nearly 2.3 million Facebook users had inter-acted with materials published by Britain First – demonstrating a far more savvy use of social media than the EDL ever did (ibid.: 17). More recently, however, Britain First has moved its (largely successful) online form of activism into the off l ine space – by carrying out demonstrations, ‘Christian Patrols’ and ‘Mosque Invasions’ in a number of areas with large Muslim populations across the UK. Drawing on an ‘increasingly confrontational and direct action approach’ (Allen 2014: 360), however, Britain First distinguishes itself here from its predecessor, the EDL – both in the level of aggression it displays and in the religious fervour that is unique to its particular form of far-right activism – with Christianity play-ing ‘a much more signif i cant role’ (ibid.); both in terms of the group’s ideology and in its street patrols and protests.Such visceral and disorderly forms of anti-Islamic protest have not gone unnoticed. Since 2010, there has been a burgeoning body of academic literature that has almost exclusively examined the rise and fall of the English Defence League. This has been debated: whether the origins and drivers of the English Defence League can be seen as far right, football hooliganism or an exclusively Introduction 3working-class phenomenon (Copsey 2010; Garland and Treadwell 2010; Jackson 2011; Alessio and Meredith 2014), and whether the EDL’s support base actually coheres with these popular stereotypes (Bartlett and Littler 2011; Goodwin 2013; Goodwin et al. 2016; Treadwell and Garland 2011). Moreover, EDL scholarship has tried to uncover the dynamics and extent of the group’s commitment to ‘anti-Islamism,’ with some ascribing a deeper, ‘Islamophobic’ cause to the group’s politics (Allen 2011; Busher 2014; Jackson 2011; Kassimeris and Jackson 2015; Pilkington 2016; Treadwell 2014). Furthermore, there have also been attempts to apply social movement theory to explain the group’s specif i c form of grassroots organisation and its (limited) trajectory – with the group going into decline a mere two years into its existence (Jackson 2011; Busher 2013, 2015; Pilkington 2016).As one prominent expert on anti-Muslim protest noted in 2014, however, we still know precious little about these groups and their ‘possible impacts’ (Busher 2014: 208). For example, few researchers have explored the effect the EDL and Britain First have had on community tensions, public-order, racially or religiously motivated hate crime, or the mobilisation of radical Islamist groups (ibid.: 1–2). Moreover, few scholars have examined the origins, ideology and modus operandi of Britain First (See Allen 2014; Hope not Hate June 2014; Brindle and Mac-Millan 2017 for exceptions). Looking again at consequences, another prominent area overlooked are how mainstream politicians have responded to anti-Islamic activism between 2009 and 2018. Only one chapter of a policy report by far-right expert Dr Nigel Copsey (2010), and one paragraph by the UK’s leading scholar on Islamophobia, Dr Chris Allen (2014), have sought to shed light on how the UK government and national politicians have engaged with this new form of anti-Islamic protest. There has, however, been no thorough-going analysis of how the UK Politicians – alongside other policy practitioners – have responded to the EDL and Britain First mobilisations where the groups have manifested themselves the most: at the local level.This omission is peculiar for several reasons. First, there has been a plethora of interventions by local authorities and mainstream political elites towards the EDL and Britain First. Most local authorities – in liaison with the police – helped manage these protests under the 1986 Public Order Act, and have therefore had to devise preparations and come up with informal policy solutions to mitigate the impacts of public disorder, community tensions and anti-Muslim attacks when these groups come to town. Moreover, the actions of these new insurgent groups have also animated Members of Parliament and local Councillors to offer their own denouncements, diagnoses and policy solutions. In particular, both MPs and Councillors regularly comment on anti-Islamic demonstrations amongst their constituencies and try to enact countermeasures to curb these groups – embarking on (sometimes extensive) local news, Parliamentary and collaborative local campaigns to obstruct the EDL and Britain First from protesting within their own particular locales. Politicians have therefore been at the forefront of responses to anti-Islamic protest in the UK.Second, these interventions speak to a wider and more pertinent philosophical question about how policymakers ‘tolerate the intolerant.’ In particular, such a 4 Introductionquestion has plagued the minds of liberal philosophers for centuries, with the likes of John Locke (1689), John Stuart Mill (1869), John Rawls (1971) and Michael Walzer (1997) all grappling with what Karl Popper once called the ‘paradox of tolerance’ – i.e. that ‘unlimited tolerance must lead to the disappearance of toler-ance’ (Popper 1945: 581). Whether (and why) local politicians have gone too far in censoring or restricting this form of far-right protest, therefore, is a weighty philosophical and moral question that can only be answered by looking at how particular local authorities and politicians have dealt with this new form of protest on a case-by-case basis.Third, a burgeoning academic interest lies in examining both the nature and effectiveness of political responses to the contemporary far right in Europe. Though mainly focussed on party-political manifestations, some scholars at the exclusivist end of far-right responses suggest that a speedy and coherent ‘no-platform’ or ‘cordon sanitaire’ response by politicians helps collapse extreme right mobilisations (Art 2007), while some inclusivists suggest that mainstream elites should try to emulate far-right policies on multiculturalism and migration (Bale et al. 2010). Furthermore, some advocate less political and more sociologi-cally informed responses – positing that, in order to reduce racial and religious prejudice, politicians should be tackling the problem of right-wing extremism at a mass level by, for example, promoting social interaction between ethnic minori-ties and other resident populations as well as stimulating greater engagement between politicians and voters (Goodwin 2011). Such typologies, however, have yet to be applied to anti-Islamic activism in the UK – omitting a systematic over-view of strategies and tactics available to policymakers when dealing with these problematic groups.More specif i cally, this delay also prevents the collation and distribution of les-sons and best practice that could be used for other, related forms of anti-Islamic protest that have grown up in recent years; both as a result of the continuing splintering and fragmentation of the BNP and EDL in the UK but also as a result of the growth of broader ‘counter-jihad’ movement internationally. Whether it be PEGIDA in Germany, the Bloc against Islam in the Czech Republic or Identitar-ian movements in Austria and France, similar questions surrounding public-order, community cohesion and counter-extremism policy will be raising their heads there. The UK case therefore speaks to a broader environment of anti-Islamic street activism that we have seen grow up in the past fi ve years, in Europe but also in North America and Australasia.Aims of the bookIn order to address this ‘response’ lacuna then, this book seeks to examine: how have UK policy practitioners responded to the English Defence League and Brit-ain First over the past nine years? This main research question will be answered through over 60 semi-structured elite interviews conducted by the author with senior police off i cers, Members of Parliament, local Councillors and behind-the-scenes off i cials who have experienced sizeable and/or frequent anti-Islamic Introduction 5protest, from 2009 to 2017. More specif i cally, we will focus on policy responses in Birmingham, Bradford, Leicester, Luton and Tower Hamlets – all places with storied histories of far-right mobilisations. These empirical case studies will form the backbone of the book and will for the fi rst time provide some answers as to what underlying factors have helped stymie or stimulate successful inter-ventions towards anti-Islamic protest. Moreover, they will also provide the basis for the fi rst rigorous and sustained scholarly analysis of EDL and Britain First demonstrations – illuminating the drivers and determinants of the groups’ main forms of anti-Islamic activism.Moving on to more theoretical concerns, the ontological and epistemological positions that underpin this book are very specif i c. In terms of the former, the ontology of the research is linked to foundationalism. This is based on the belief that there is a world out there to be discovered, but that ‘the real world effect on actions is mediated by ideas’ (Furlong and Marsh 2010: 190). Moreover, in terms of the epistemological approach taken, a realist interpretation of events is used. In the case of political responses, for example, local politicians’ understanding of anti-Islam protest groups, their political belief systems and understanding of their role are crucial in understanding how they respond to and manage the group. Moreover, and as shown in Figure 1.1, the local political and social con-text as well as politician’s life experiences temper this more ideational fi eld of understanding – determining the types of responses, how they are arrived at and what elites deem to be ‘possible’ when managing anti-Islamic protests.What will be found in the course of this study, therefore, is that while the default response of local mainstream political elites has been to exclude both of these groups, there have also been more limited cases of inclusion – with policy-makers sustainably engaging with both communities affected by and communities prone to support anti-Islamic activism. It will be argued that a renewed emphasis needs to be placed on this more local-level engagement and interaction in order to responsibly deal with and prevent the threat posed by the EDL and Britain First, as well as other far-right groups, in the years and decades to come. Only by tackling the populist and prejudicial drivers of such groups can we ameliorate their poten-tially divisive and corrosive impact on UK politics and society.Outline of the bookBefore detailing this book’s fi ndings and discussing their implications, we will spend the next chapter placing this current wave of anti-Islamic protest in interna-tional, historical and contemporary context. The purpose of Chapter 1 will there-fore be to examine how the current epoch fi ts within the history of the UK far right, as well as a broader shift in the European far right towards anti-Islamic campaigns. Chapter 2 will then move on to detail the book’s typology and what specif i c policy countermeasures can be brought against anti-Islamic groups. The main purpose of this chapter is to familiarise the reader with the burgeoning litera-ture on responses to the far right in Europe more generally as well as responses to the EDL and Britain First more specif i cally. Following this discussion of typology, Informed by:Causal beliefs (e.g. understanding of the EDL and Britain First)Principled beliefs (e.g. poli?cal beliefs, commitment to democra?c values)Iden?ty (e.g. role of poli?cians vis-a-vis one another)Mediated by:Cogni?ve-material-ins?tu?onalfactors(e.g. understanding of social, poli?cal and economic context, life experience, parameters of public order legisla?on/Parliamentary procedure)Resul?ng in:Poli?cal response (i.e. rhetorical, legal, or campaigning strategy; with either an exclusionary or inclusionary outcome)Or, ‘non-response’Figure 1.1 Causal model of politicians’ responsesSource: Based on the typology used in Goldstein and Keohane (1993: 8–11). Introduction 7we will move on to look at the book’s main fi ndings. The main part of this book looks at fi ve UK locations where the EDL and Britain First have demonstrated the most and in sizeable numbers: Birmingham, Bradford, Leicester, Luton and Tower Hamlets. Each chapter deals with a separate case study and will, fi rst, detail the background of each urban location before examining the strategies used by elites when anti-Islamic protest has come to town. What will be found in the main bodies of these chapters is that, while a tiny minority of local authorities have been arguably ‘ready’ to deal with these protests, the majority of local authorities have been on sizeable organisational learning processes in order to adapt, address and calibrate their responses to this new form of anti-Islamic protest. This has seen mixed results that have ranged from political schism to signif i cant success in curbing this new far-right ‘threat.’Last but not least, the book will conclude by evaluating the nature and effec-tiveness of these responses. It will be argued here that a shift from exclusion towards more dynamic forms of inclusion are needed in order to address the EDL, Britain First and other UK anti-Islam groups that have become a lightning rod for white working-class disaffection over recent years. Moreover, and specif i cally in relation to the public-order aspects of managing anti-Islamic protests, it will be suggested that a more low-key, consensual style of policing and a less confronta-tional style of anti-fascist activism is needed in order to help ameliorate the poten-tially disorderly effects of such demonstrations. Before we come to this, however, we fi rst need to establish how the EDL and Britain First fi t into the UK’s broader history of far-right activism, as well as the broader context of anti-Islamic protest. It is to this task that the fi rst chapter will now turn.Note1 Here, ‘anti-Islamic’ is used to describe the English Defence League and Britain First’s particular form of protest. This is a slightly altered version of Pilkington’s (2016) ‘anti-Islamist’ characterisation of the EDL and aims at the groups’ main area of grievance: not just radical Islam or ‘Islamism,’ but the beliefs, tenets and theology of Islam itself.BibliographyAlessio, D. and Meredith, K. (2014) ‘Blackshirts for the Twenty-f i rst Century? Fascism and the English Defence League.’ Social Identities. 20 (1): 104–118.Alexander, H. (8th April 2012) ‘France Election 2012: Islam Takes Centre Stage in Bat-tle for France.’ The Daily Telegraph. Hyperlink: www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ europe/france/9191923/France-election-2012-Islam-takes-centre-stage-in-battle-for-France.html. Date Accessed: 23/09/2014.Allen, C. (2011) ‘Opposing Islamif i cation or Promoting Islamophobia? Understanding the English Defence League.’ Patterns of Prejudice. 45 (4): 279–294.Allen, C. (2014) ‘Britain First: The “Frontline Resistance” to the Islamif i cation of Britain.’ Political Quarterly. 85 (3): 354–361.Art, D. (2007) ‘Reacting to the Radical-right: Lessons from Germany and Austria.’ Party Politics. 13 (3): 331–349. 8 IntroductionBale, T., Green-Pederson, C., Krouwel, A., Luther, K. R. and Sitter, M. (2010) ‘If You Can’t Beat Them, Join Them? Explaining Social Democratic Responses to the Challenge from the Populist Radical-right in Western Europe.’ Political Studies. 58 (3): 410–426.Bartlett, J. and Littler, M. (November 2011) Inside the EDL: Populist Politics in a Digi-tal Age. London: Demos. Hyperlink: www.demos.co.uk/f i les/Inside_the_edl_WEB.pdf. Date Accessed: 23/01/2017.Brindle, A. and MacMillan, C. (2017) ‘Like & Share If You Agree: A Study of Discourses and Cyber-activism of the Far Right British Nationalist Party Britain First.’ Journal of Language Aggression and Conf l ict. 5 (1): 108–133.British National Party. (2005) Rebuilding British Democracy: British National Party Gen-eral Election 2005 Manifesto. Welshpool: BNP. 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Ref l ections on the Ideologi-cal Evolution of the British National Party 1999–2006.’ Patterns of Prejudice. 41 (1): 61–82.Copsey, N. (2010) The English Defence League: Challenging Our Country and Our Values of Social Inclusion, Fairness, and Equality. London: Faith Matters. Hyperlink: http://fath-matters.org/images/stories/fm-reports/english-defense-league-report.pdf. Date Accessed: 23/01/2017.English Defence League Website. (15th January 2013) ‘About Us: Mission Statement.’ Hyperlink: https://web.archive.org/web/20130115001308/http://englishdefenceleague.org/about-us. Date Accessed: 23/01/2017.Feldman, M. and Littler, M. (July 2014) ‘Tell MAMA 2013/14 Anti-Muslim Overview, Analysis and “Cumulative Extremism”.’ Hyperlink: www.tees.ac.uk/docs/DocRepo/Research/Tell_Mama.pdf. Date Accessed: 23/01/2017.Furlong, P. and Marsh, D. (2010) ‘A Skin Not a Sweater: Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science.’ In: Marsh, D., and Stoker, G. (eds.) Theory and Methods in Political Science. Houndsmill, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. PP. 183–210.Garland, J. and Treadwell, J. (2010) ‘ “No Surrender to the Taliban”: Football Hooligan-ism, Islamophobia and the Rise of the English Defence League.’ Conference Paper for the British Criminological Society. 10: 19–35. Hyperlink: www.britsoccrim.org/vol ume10/2010_Garland_Treadwell.pdf. Date Accessed: 23/01/2017.Goldstein, J. and Keohane, R. (1993) Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.Goodwin, M. J. (2011) Right Response: Understanding and Countering Populist Extrem-ism in Europe. London: Chatham House. Hyperlink: www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/f i les/r0911_goodwin.pdf. Date Accessed: 23/01/2017.Goodwin, M.J. (2013) The Roots of Extremism: The English Defence League and the Counter-Jihad Challenge. London: Chatham House. Hyperlink: https://www. Introduction 9chathamhouse.org/sites/default/f i les/public/Research/Europe/0313bp_goodwin.pdf. Date Accessed: 17/09/2018.Goodwin, M. J., Cutts, D. and Janta-Lipinski, L. (2016) ‘Economic Losers, Protesters, Isla-mophobes or Xenophobes? Predicting Public Support for a Counter-Jihad Movement.’ Political Studies. 64 (1): 4–26. Hyperlink: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.12159. Date Accessed: 23/01/2017.Harrison, D. (14th March 2009) ‘Luton’s Muslim Extremists Defy Public Anger.’ The Daily Tele-graph. Hyperlink: www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/4991313/Lutons- Muslim-ex...

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